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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5110
By 2050, two-thirds of the world’s population will live 
in cities, and the greatest growth in urban populations 
will take place in the least developed countries. This 
presents many governments with considerable challenges 
related to urban governance and the provision of services 
and opportunities to a burgeoning urban population. 
Among the concerns is that large youth bulges in 
urban centers could be a source of political instability 
and violence. Here, we assess this claim empirically 
using newly collected data on city-level urban social 
disorder, ranging from non-violent actions, such as 
demonstrations and strikes, to violent political actions, 
such as riots, terrorism, and armed conflict. The 
dataset covers 55 major cities in Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa for 1960–2006. The study also utilizes a new 
United Nations Population Division dataset on urban 
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populations by age and sex. The study further considers 
factors that could condition the effect of age structure, in 
particular the level of informal employment, economic 
growth, education, and gender imbalances. The analysis 
finds that large male youth bulges aged 15–24 are not 
generally associated with increased risks of either violent 
or non-violent social disturbance. Furthermore, the 
proxy measures of “youth exclusion” do not seem to 
increase the risk that large urban male youth bulges are 
associated with either form of disturbance. However, 
several other factors that may be associated with higher 
levels of youth exclusion—notably absence of democratic 
institutions, low economic growth, and low levels of 
secondary educational attainment—are significantly and 
robustly associated with increasing levels of urban social 
disturbance. 
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According to UN projections, the year 2008 marks a milestone in that more than half of the 
world population now lives in cities (UN, 2008a). This trend will continue unabated over the 
next decades. By 2050, two-thirds of the world’s population will be urban dwellers and virtually 
all population growth in this period, a total increase of around 3 billion people, will take place in 
cities around the world. Although cities in developed countries will also continue to grow over 
the next decades, less developed countries will experience the most rapid urban growth. In 
particular, this pertains to Africa and Asia where rural households still account for around 60 
percent of the total population, but are expected to drop to 35-40 percent by 2050. In Asia alone, 
the absolute increase in urban population is projected to be 1.8 billion, in Africa 0.9 billion (UN, 
2008a: 1). 
  Strong urban growth creates considerable challenges for governments in terms of 
managing urban development sustainably, and providing for housing, electricity, water supply, 
health care, education and jobs. These challenges are widely acknowledged by developing 
country governments, and 78 percent of African and 71 percent of Asian governments state that 
they have implemented policies to reduce migrant flows to large cities (UN, 2008a: 12). In many 
developing countries urban centers offer better social and economic opportunities for young 
people than rural areas do. But if governments fail to provide opportunities and services to a 
growing urban population, increased grievances may arise, fuelling protest and possibly also 
political violence. A particular security concern has been that disenfranchised and economically 
and socially excluded urban youth may engage in violent activities, whether ‘criminal’ or 
‘political’. Youth often constitute a disproportionately large part of rural-to-urban migrants, and 
in countries with young populations, strong urbanization could lead to an extraordinary crowding 
of youth in urban centers. This could lead to pressures in the labor market or educational 
institutions that could cause grievances. Goldstone (1991; 2002) observes that historically, the 
coincidence of youth bulges with rapid urbanization, especially in the context of unemployment 
and poverty, has been an important contributor to political violence. 
  Previous research has found that on the aggregate national level, large youth cohorts are 
statistically associated with an increase in risk of outbreak of low-intensity conflict (Urdal, 
2006). On the other hand, and despite much concern for the ills of urbanization, rapid urban 
growth rates do not appear to correlate with political violence (Homer-Dixon, 1999: 155). If 
anything, high urbanization rates appear to be associated with lower levels of violent conflict 
(Urdal, 2005; 2008). These results reflect the observation that most armed conflicts take place in 
peripheral and often rural areas (Buhaug & Rød, 2006; Sommers, 2006; Buhaug, Cederman & 
Rød, 2008). Urban slum areas are rarely the location of conventional violent political conflicts 
between organized armed groups.  
Acknowledging the lower relevance of urbanization and urban social and economic 
conditions for conventional armed conflicts, this study addresses the issue of youth and 
urbanization from a different angle than most previous quantitative studies. It focuses on how 
urbanization and patterns of social and economic exclusion affect social disorder in urban centers 
with a high concentration of youth. It utilizes a newly collected event dataset of urban social 
disturbance covering 55 major cities in 49 Asian and African countries for the 1960-2006 period. 
The data are compiled from electronic news reports in the Keesing’s Record of World Events, 
and involves both non-violent events like peaceful demonstrations and protests, as well as violent 




age and gender structure in the context of crucial intervening factors like poverty, democracy, 
education, employment and urban population growth. 
  This study, which we believe is the first cross-sectional time-series study to address 
political instability and violence at the city level, is a correlational and exploratory exercise 
aimed at trying to identify potential statistical relationships for further study. The current analysis 
is considerably restricted by the availability of reliable time-series data on the city level. The 
only major source to compare city-specific social and economic indicators, the UN Habitat’s 
Global Urban Observatory, only provides data from two collection efforts conducted in 1993 and 
1998. Although the database covers around 200 cities, only 24 of the cities included in this 
analysis are represented both years
2. Certain indicators were also not collected in both rounds. 
Due to the lack of city-specific data, we have had to rely on age structure data for the entire 
urban population at the national level. Similarly, for political, economic and education variables 
we have used national-level data. These limitations illustrate the need for additional collection of 
comparable city-specific data in a situation where the monitoring of urban development becomes 
ever more important, and call for considerable caution in the interpretation of the results. 
Keeping this in mind, the current study suggests that increasing congregation of young males in 
urban centers may not affect the risk of social disorder, whether nonviolent or violent. 
Furthermore, contextual factors such as low secondary education levels, expansions in tertiary 
education, high levels of informal employment, male gender imbalances, and low economic 
growth do not appear to affect the relationship between large urban youth bulges and social 
disturbance. Among the factors that clearly do correlate with social disturbance are regime type, 
economic growth, ongoing armed conflict, and prior disturbance.  
 
 
2. Theoretical framework  
Over the past decade, much of the developing world has experienced a significant mortality 
decline, while fertility typically has remained high for some time. These changes, broadly 
referred to as the ‘demographic transition’, have greatly affected age structures and produced 
youthful populations, or ‘youth bulges’, in many countries. Often, great shifts in the age structure 
overall has led to particularly strong increases in urban youth populations due to migration of 
young people from rural areas into cities in search of education and jobs (Lee, 1966; McKenzie, 
2008; Homer-Dixon, 1999: 157). Sometimes, age selection in migration can be considerable 
given that young people are more likely to have higher future earning potential and also less 
likely to have investments in a family or other local interests which would prevent them from 
moving (Lundborg, 1991).  
The literature on youth bulges and political violence has in particular focused on 
spontaneous and low-intensity disturbance and violence similar to what we may expect to find in 
urban settings. Youth bulges arguably provide both opportunities and motives for social 
disturbance and political violence. According to what is generally referred to as the ‘opportunity 
perspective’, engagement in political violence is seen as a rational economic calculation of 
potential benefits over expected costs. The presence of relatively large youth cohorts is a factor 
that generally can be argued to reduce the opportunity cost of young persons (Collier, 2000: 94; 
                                                            




Machunovich 2000: 236). Specifically, social or economic marginalization might prevent the 
accumulation of human capital and wealth and increase competition for employment, thereby 
reducing the ‘alternative cost’ to engaging in violence (Collier, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2000).  
Where some form of benefit exists that exceeds expected costs of participating, the risk of 
disturbance and violence increases. While low-intensity social disturbance events may offer 
relatively small economic benefits, they might involve rents like looting, protection money and 
ransoms. On the other side, the cost of participation may also be quite small. 
Another strain of the literature focuses on how youth bulges may provide motives for 
political violence. Large youth cohorts have been argued to be particularly likely to provide 
motivation for violence if they face unemployment, expansions in higher education with limited 
employment opportunities, lack of political openness, and crowding in urban centers (Moller, 
1968; Choucri, 1974; Braungart, 1984; Huntington 1996; Goldstone, 1991; 2001; Cincotta et al., 
2003). Hence, youth engage in violence as a means to redress economic, political or social 
inequalities and perceived grievances. Homer-Dixon (1999: 157) claims that ‘young urban 
populations, especially unemployed young men, are easier to mobilize for radical political ends; 
and young populations generate enormous demands for the provision of social resources like 
education and jobs’. Further, in urban areas where young men have lost touch with their families 
and rural support networks, gangs or armed groups may offer camaraderie and support as an 
alternative to a family unit (Stavrou et al., 2000).  
Previously, Fearon & Laitin (2003) and Collier & Hoeffler (2004) have not found any 
support for the youth bulge hypothesis in cross-national studies of civil war, while Esty et al. 
(1998) found a statistical relationship between youth bulges and ethnic conflict, and Urdal (2006; 
2008) reports statistically significant effects of youth bulges on low-intensity political violence. 
Hoelscher (2008), in what may be the first city-level time-series study of urban insecurity, finds 
that national-level youth bulges are statistically associated with higher homicide rates in cities. 
While we do not propose that young urban age structures necessarily lead to increased 
disturbance and violence, forms of exclusion that may pertain especially to large youth cohorts, 
such as depressing effects on young male employment rates and wages (see e.g. Korenman & 
Neumark, 1997; Machunovich, 2003) are not necessarily well captured by existing data sources. 
Hence, assuming that large urban youth cohorts are more likely to experience economic and 
social exclusion, we propose that generally: 
 
H1: Large urban youth bulges are associated with higher levels of urban social disorder. 
 
 
2.1 Economic exclusion and unemployment 
When overurbanization combines with underdevelopment, and where job creation and economic 
growth can’t keep up with urban growth, violence and instability may arguably arise (Goldstone, 
2002: 10).  Youth unemployment is a significant problem in much of the developing world. The 
inability to find gainful employment limits young people’s income and skill development. Early 
age unemployment can negatively affect future earnings and increase the likelihood of later 
joblessness (e.g. see ILO, 1998, 2004; Mroz & Savage, 2001). Further it appears that urban 
youth often face far higher unemployment than the general population. This is particularly 
evident in Sub Saharan Africa, where, for example, Ethiopia’s urban youth unemployment is 




of Namibia’s 15-19 year old urban youth are unemployed compared to 24.2% of rural youth and 
19.5% of the general working age population overall (Kayenze et al, 2000: 7).  
A challenge when assessing the level of economic exclusion among young people across 
countries and time is the lack of relevant indicators. Youth unemployment rates are provided by 
the ILO only as estimates on the regional level, lacking good and comparable country-level data 
(ILO, 2008). In addition to using indicators of underemployment, measured as unemployment 
rates and employment in the informal sector, we also assume that overall changes in income per 
capita is a proxy that to some extent captures changes in employment opportunities among young 
people: 
 
H2: The lower prospects for employment, the greater the effect of large urban youth 
bulges on urban social disorder. 
 
H3: The lower per capita growth in income, the greater the effect of large urban youth 




Generally, higher education is a factor that should be expected to reduce the likelihood that 
young people engage in political violence, due to higher opportunity cost (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004). This argument may pertain in particular to the recruitment to rebel organizations. Young 
men with low education and low prospects for employment are more susceptible to joining a 
rebel group as a way to generate a livelihood. Interestingly, Oyefusi (2008) finds that while 
educated youth in the Niger Delta were generally more politically mobilized and more aggrieved, 
uneducated youth were more likely to be willing to participate in armed struggle for local 
resource control. This is also supported by Barker & Ricardo (2005). Furthermore, low education 
levels are generally associated with higher risks of armed conflict (Thyne, 2006; Barakat & 
Urdal, 2008). 
  But it has also been suggested that high unemployment among educated youth is one of 
the most destabilizing and potentially violent socio-political phenomena in any regime (Choucri, 
1974: 73; Braungart, 1984: 16; Goldstone, 2001; Winckler, 2002: 635). In countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), many Islamic movements that challenged authoritarian 
governments in the 1990s were fueled by large educated youth cohorts entering the labor markets 
during a period of weak economic conditions (Yousef, 2003: 23). In many countries it has also 
been observed that educated youth experience higher unemployment rates than uneducated 
youth. In the 1990s, for example, MENA had the world’s highest youth unemployment rates, yet 
the expansion of education had little impact on reducing this. In Morocco and Algeria, 
unemployment rates among higher educated youth have been as high as 70% (World Bank, 
2008: 220). But there is also an issue of mismatch between the skills that students obtain and the 
demands of the labor market in MENA. Here higher education is largely seen as a way to secure 
public sector employment, a legacy from large-scale public employment schemes. The education 
system does not, however, stimulate the development of skills that are in demand in the growing 
private sector, such as independent and critical thinking (Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillon, 2008; 
World Bank, 2008). The expansion of tertiary education without the ability for graduates to be 




for militant organizations (Lia, 2005: 145–146). Similar grievances promoting educated youth to 
engage in political violence have been anecdotally reported in Kenya (Kahl 1998:103), Thailand 
(Xenos 2004:28), and Sri Lanka (Braungart 1984:14–15). 
 
H4: The lower the level of education, the greater the effect of large urban youth bulges on 
urban social disorder. 
 
H5: The stronger the increases in youth with higher education, the greater the effect of 
large urban youth bulges on urban social disorder. 
 
 
2.3 Gender imbalance 
Gender selection in migration can lead to gender imbalances in urban youth populations. In 
many countries, rural to urban migration has traditionally been dominated by young male labor 
migrants, often engaged in seasonal, circular migration. It has been suggested that the male 
selectivity in migration may be due to greater returns to migrating for males. The urban to rural 
wage gap is generally greater for males than for females, and as a result the observable gains to 
migrating to cities are greater for males (Agesa & Agesa, 1999). At the same time, high fertility 
levels have traditionally contributed to limit mobility for women (Brokerhoff & Eu, 1993). 
However, in more recent decades there has been a greater recognition of the ‘feminisation of 
migration’ (Castles & Miller, 1998), and in some developing countries the propensity to migrate 
is now greater for young women than for young men. Some scholars have argued that male 
surpluses create competition for marriage and jobs between young unattached males, increasing 
the risks for instability and violence (Mesquida & Wiener, 1996; Hudson & den Boer, 2004). 
 
H6: The greater the number of young urban males over young urban females, the greater 
the effect of large urban youth bulges on urban social disorder. 
 
 
3. Research design and model 
The study covers 55 major cities, 23 in Sub-Saharan Africa and 32 in Central and East Asia, in 
49 different countries for the 1960-2006 period. The temporal-spatial domain is determined by a 
new dataset on urban social disorder compiled from electronic news reports in the ‘Keesing’s 
Record of World Events’ (KRWE). The data collection builds on a similar project developed for 
the State Failure Task Force (Marshall, 2001). All electronic searches were done manually by 
human coders, using a specific search algorithm containing terms associated with political 
violence and disturbance (see Urdal, 2008b). Each returned report was then screened individually 
to determine relevance. For all events that were deemed relevant, the following information was 
coded: name of country and city; type of event; day, month and year for the beginning and the 
end of an event; actor(s) and target(s); number of participants and number of deaths; location of 
event. Type of event was chosen from a pre-defined list of 12 categories, while no pre-defined 
categories were developed for actors and targets. Given the sometimes limited information 
provided by the news reports, a set of coding rules were developed to determine whether an 
event should be included in the dataset. First, it was established whether the event took place 




reported as having happened 1) in the city itself, or in a location clearly defined as part of the 
city; 2) in the ‘suburbs’ or ‘outskirts’ of the city in question; 3) near or in a central government 
building when coding a national capital; 4) at a location that the coders were able to locate as 
being within the city (for instance a specific palace or monument). Second, events that according 
to the report appeared to have a purely criminal, non-political motive were excluded, although in 
some cases it was not possible to establish firmly whether an event was of political or criminal 
character. Third, it was necessary to develop procedures to distinguish between discrete events in 
a series of related disturbance. Events were coded as discrete events if (in decreasing order of 
importance): 1) it was possible to distinguish between different actors and targets; 2) events took 
place in different locations; 3) reported motives for the events were clearly different. As a rule of 
thumb, at least two of these criteria had to be met before an event was coded as a separate event. 
However, if a report clearly identified different actors and/or targets, events were coded 
separately. Furthermore, the time period within which a series of events happened determined 
whether events were coded as discrete. If a series of events involving the same actors and targets 
happened within a short period of time, this would normally be coded as one event (typically 
several bombs against government targets happening within few days). If events involving the 
same actors and targets are spaced by at least seven days, they would normally be coded as 
different events.  
While news reports in the KRWE do not cover all relevant social disturbance events, we 
assume that the levels of social disturbance reported are representative for trends between cities 
and across time. However, there are potentially important biases in such event data. First, strong 
and autocratic regimes may to some degree succeed in censoring information about disturbance 
events. On the other hand, they are also likely to be relatively successful in preventing 
disturbance events from happening; distinguishing between bias and regime effect is inherently 
difficult.
3 A second potential bias may arise from the fact that certain geographic areas are better 
covered by the media than others. Events happening in countries that are low on the international 
agenda may be less likely to be reported than similar events in countries of high political and 
economic strategic importance. Finally, a third bias may arise from improvements in 
communications technology over time and increasing international presence in more locations 
generally, which could lead to a time trend bias. These time trends may also vary geographically, 
as certain regions may wane in economic or geopolitical importance over time, while others wax.  
The dataset covers different forms of both violent and non-violent politically motivated 
disorder, including demonstrations, rioting, terrorism and armed conflict. To the extent that 
information in the news sources allow, each event is coded with precise date and location, and 
casualties. Here, we use two count measures of urban social disorder aggregated to the annual 
level for each city. We separate between lethal events, including only those events reported to 
have resulted in at least one death, while non-lethal events include only those events where no 
deaths were reported. While we assume that most non-lethal events are also non-violent events, 
we cannot rule out that for some events, deaths that did occur were never reported in news 
sources. 
There are a total of 3,375 events coded, of which 1,378 (40.8 per cent) are reported to 
have led to fatalities. When added together we can see that, over time, there has been an 
increasing trend, both in the number of total events and in the number of lethal events, albeit 
                                                            




with very considerable variation from one year to the next (Figure 1). As can be seen from the 
linear trends, the total number of events has been rising more rapidly than the number of lethal 
events. This could be a consequence of better reporting, where, over time, less serious events are 
reported to a greater extent in the media.  
 
 
Figure 1 Trends in all and lethal events, 1960-2006 
 
 
When separating African and Asian events, Africa is trailing behind in absolute numbers, partly 
because there are fewer African cities coded (Figure 2). If we consider the time-trends, it is clear 
that over time the increase in reported events has been greater for Asian than for African cities, 
as illustrated by the steeper Asian linear trend line. For the entire period 1960-2006, 72 social 
disturbance events were reported for the average Asian city, against 46 reported events for the 









If we consider instead the relationship between city population size and urban social disorder 
events (Figure 3), we get an idea about trends in ‘per capita’ disturbance. If more people living in 
cities would automatically mean more disturbances we would expect to see a stable, horizontal 
per capita trend over time. However, Figure 3 shows a clearly declining trend, and especially so 
for Sub-Saharan Africa, indicating that the growth in urban populations has been much greater 
than the growth in social disorder events.   
 
 







We use negative binomial regression to analyze both event count measures. This approach was 
chosen due to the skewed distribution of events with a few high-violence observations and a 
majority of relatively peaceful ones. The unit of analysis is city-year, and the models are run with 
a lagged dependent variable to account for the fact that observations over time for the same city 
are not independent, and with city fixed effects to account for unobserved city-specific factors. 
33.9 per cent of all city-years have coded one or more non-lethal events, while for 25.2 of the 
city-years, there are at least one violent event coded.  
The main explanatory variable is the relative size of young males in the male urban adult 
population. Estimates for rural and urban populations by gender and age for all countries in the 
world have recently been made available by the United Nations Population Division (UN, 
2008b). The estimates are disaggregated into 5 year age groups covering each 5 year period from 
1950 to 2005.  
From this data source, we calculate two measures, urban male youth bulges and urban 
male youth growth. The former is defined as the urban male population aged 15-24 year olds as a 
percentage of the urban male population of 15 years and above, and measures the ‘youthfulness’ 
of the urban adult male population. Urban male youth growth is defined as a ratio measuring the 
number of 15-24 year old males in one five-year period compared to the number of 15-24 year 
old males in the previous five-year period. Hence, this is an indicator of how rapid the youth 
population is growing.  
Because there are often both age and gender selection in rural to urban migration, one 
might expect to see biases in urban populations both in age and gender composition. Figure 4 
shows this trend. In Sub Saharan Africa 15-24 year old males consistently comprise a greater 
percentage of the population than in rural areas. Asian countries however have shown both a 
decline in the relative size of both rural and urban youth populations.  
 
 




A particular concern for this project has been whether the country-level estimates for the entire 
urban populations reasonably reflect the age and gender composition of the specific cities 




the estimates for total population size for each city with the corresponding estimate for the total 
urban population of that country from the UN data. The discrepancy between city population size 
and total urban population was largest for the two most populous countries, China and India. 
Beijing made up only 2.2 percent of the 2005 urban population in China, while New Delhi, 
Mumbai and Calcutta together accounted for about 13 percent of the urban Indian population. 
Generally, Sub-Saharan African cities make up a greater share of their country’s total urban 
population compared to Asian cities. Of the 54 cities for which there are corresponding country 
estimates
4, 22 of the cities have populations that exceed 30 percent of total urban population in 
2005, while 30 cities make up 20 percent or more. In most cases, the cities included in this 
analysis accounted for a larger share of total urban population in previous decades. To try to 
reduce possible biases caused by actual differences in age and gender structures between total 
urban population and that of the cities in question, we also ran models excluding the cities that 
accounted for the lowest shares of total urban population.
5  
  Measures for five contextual factors used to construct interaction variables with urban 
male youth bulges were compiled. National-level estimates for secondary educational attainment 
levels for 20-24 year-old males and expansion in tertiary education for males aged 20-29 were 
taken from Barakat & Urdal (2008). Data on informal unemployment measures the share of 
population employed in the informal sector on the city level, and originate from the UN Habitat’s 
(2008) Global Urban Observatory. We assume that higher levels of informal employment reflect 
lower economic opportunities in the formal economy. The database provides estimates for two 
points in time only, 1993 and 1998. The 1993 estimates were assigned to the 1990-1995 period, 
while the 1998 estimate was assigned to years from 1996 through 2000. Data on urban male 
youth bias comes from UN (2008b), while annual economic growth rates are calculated based on 
real GDP per capita estimates provided by Gleditsch (2002). All interaction variables were 
centered on their means. 
  We further added the following control variables: level of development measured by real 
GDP per capita (Gleditsch, 2002), regime type (Marshall & Jaggers, 2000), city population size 
(UN, annual, see Appendix C for variable construction), and ongoing armed conflict (Gleditsch 
et al., 2002). More details on coding and sources are provided in Appendix C. 
  A major caveat about the present study is the general low availability of relevant and 
comparable time-series data on the city level. The use of national-level aggregate measures raises 
the issue of whether these are valid as indicators of city-level conditions. Furthermore, there are 
quality and coverage issues with the UN Habitat’s (2008) Global Urban Observatory (GUO) 
data. The GUO provides a total of 20 key indicators related to social, economic, environmental 
and governance issues, for a total of about 200 cities. However, only two rounds of data 
collection have been completed by the UN Habitat (1993 and 1998), while the results from a 
third round have yet to be made available. Even for the two data points that have been made 
public, not all cities and all indicators are covered in both rounds. Unemployment rates, for 
instance, are only available for the 1998 round.
6 The informal unemployment data that we have 
                                                            
4 The UN does not provide data for Taiwan (Taipei). 
5 In addition to the mentioned Chinese and Indian cities, we also excluded Lhasa and Islamabad. 
6 The very limited coverage of this variable unfortunately proved to make it impossible to use for the current study. 
We also considered other GUO variables, in particular slum indicators and tenure status that could potentially proxy 




included are also of somewhat questionable reliability. There is insufficient information provided 
on the sources and estimation techniques used to arrive at figures for the size of the informal 
sector, and for certain cities, there are very significant changes between the two observations. 
One example is Colombo, Sri Lanka, where informal employment levels are measured at 19 
percent in 1993, and 69 per cent in 1998. 
  Finally, there is an issue of potential endogeneity related to the use of the economic 
growth variable. While it is a highly plausible scenario that economic decline and economic 
shocks are related to social urban disorder, and conversely that high economic growth may 
contribute to quell urban disorder, it is also plausible that serious episodes of disorder may have 
a negative impact on economic growth rates. The most serious episodes of disorder in the dataset 
are related to armed conflicts, and to account for the impact that conflict may have on economic 
productivity we are controlling for ongoing armed conflict in the empirical models. This should 
at least partly mediate the problem of endogeneity. While the lagging of explanatory variables is 
a common way to reduce endogeneity problems, there are no compelling theoretical reasons for 
doing so in this case as economic growth in one year is less likely to be associated with urban 
social disorder the year after. The possible two-way relationship between economic growth and 





Table 1 displays the results from the basic model including the measures for urban male youth 
bulges and urban male youth bias, and control variables. We have separated the analysis into 
lethal and non-lethal events, as the two types of events seem to be associated with slightly 
different patterns and because combined models did not provide important additional insights. 
The sign for urban male youth bulges is positive for lethal events (Model 1), but clearly 
statistically insignificant, while negatively associated with nonlethal events (Model 2). While the 
latter relationship is also statistically insignificant, the greater Z score indicates that the 
relationship is statistically more robust.
7  Urban male youth bias is very clearly not statistically 
associated with levels of urban social disorder in any of the models in Table 1, nor in any later 
models. When considering the growth in urban male youth populations (Models 3 and 4), the 
term is negative and statistically insignificant, but again with relatively high Z scores. Hence, the 
overall finding from the basic models is that urban youth bulges and growth in urban youth 
populations appear to be associated with lower levels of disturbance rather than higher. 
  Among the control variables, the size of city population is consistently positively 
associated with disorder, although statistically significant only in Model 1. While also 
statistically insignificant, higher income levels are associated with less lethal events, but more 
non-lethal events, while higher economic growth rates are consistently and clearly statistically 
associated with lower levels of disturbance. Semi-autocratic governments appear to have higher 
levels of both lethal and nonlethal disturbance events than autocracies and democracies. 
Furthermore, and expectedly, ongoing armed conflicts and the lagged dependent variable 
                                                            
7 Given the exploratory nature of this project we will also be commenting upon the relative strengths of relationships 




measuring the number of disorder events in the previous year are consistently and strongly 
associated with higher levels of urban social disorder. 
  The four models were also run on the reduced sample excluding Islamabad and cities in 
China and India,
8 and in separate runs without controls for armed conflict and prior social 
disorder. None of these alternative models produced discernable changes in the main results. 
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* Sign at 0.1 
** Sign at 0.05 
***Sign at 0.01.  
 
In Table 2, the same four models are run separately for Sub-Sahara African cities. The models 
largely reproduce the results from Table 1, but there are some notable differences. In Model 5, 
urban male youth bulges are significantly and positively associated with higher levels of lethal 
events. However, the growth in urban youth populations is associated with significantly lower 
                                                            
8 This was done to see if the results changed if we excluded the cities for which the city population only made up a 
very small share of the total urban population. The rationale for doing this was to reduce potential bias from using 




levels of both lethal and nonlethal events. This difference between level and change may suggest 
that while pressures associated with large urban youth bulges may be associated with higher 
levels of lethal disturbance in Sub-Sahara African cities, young people in SSA generally migrate 
towards the urban centers that provide opportunities. Hence, growth in urban youth populations 
may primarily reflect where economic opportunities are most promising. Income levels, 
economic growth, democracy, armed conflict and prior disorder have similar effects for the SSA 
countries as for the entire sample.  
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* Sign at 0.1 
** Sign at 0.05 
***Sign at 0.01.  
 
The first three interaction models are presented in Table 3. Neither secondary educational 
attainment, expansion in tertiary education, nor high levels of informal employment interact with 
large urban male youth bulges to increase the level of social disturbance. The closest in terms of 
statistical significance levels, is that the interaction between urban youth and expansion in 
tertiary education is positively associated with higher levels of nonlethal events (Model 12). 




levels of lethal events. The pacifying effect of secondary education also holds when the 
interaction term is excluded from the model.  Income and education are often considered to both 
measure pacifying aspects of ‘development’, but similar to what has been found for armed 
conflict (Barakat & Urdal, 2008), educational attainment seems to curb political violence beyond 
the effect of income. Expansion in tertiary education, on the other hand, does not appear to affect 
levels of social disturbance when entered separately. 
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* Sign at 0.1 
** Sign at 0.05 
***Sign at 0.01. Interaction and constitutive terms are centered on their means. Secondary 
education has been inverted so that a high value on the interaction term reflects high urban youth bulges and low 





The last two interaction variables are presented in Table 4. The economic growth variable has 
been inverted to create an interaction term where a high value indicate large youth bulges and 
low economic growth, expected to be associated with higher levels of disturbance. However, 
neither urban male bias nor low economic growth appears to influence the relationship between 
urban male youth bulges and disturbance in the expected direction. On the contrary, the 
interaction term between youth and economic growth is negative and statistically significant at 
the 10% confidence level. 
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* Sign at 0.1 
** Sign at 0.05 
***Sign at 0.01. Interaction and constitutive terms are centered on their means. Economic 








Issues of urban governance and urban insecurities have received increasing attention with the 
rapid urbanization rates in many developing countries. Many governments also perceive rapid 
urban growth as problematic and have implemented measures to curb urban growth rates. This 
paper addresses one of the emerging urban security concerns, whether large young male 
populations congregating in urban centers may contribute to political instability and violence, 
here generally referred to as ‘social disorder’. While large young male populations in urban 
centers are often perceived as a potential source of instability and violence in the context of high 
levels of economic, social and political exclusion, urban centers may also offer better economic 
opportunities for young people compared to rural areas. Hence, under some conditions, the 
migration of young people from the countryside to cities could contribute to reduce overall youth 
exclusion, and should not necessarily be expected to increase levels of urban social disorder.  
  This paper offers an empirical analysis into the relationships between urban male youth 
bulges, youth exclusion, and social disorder. The analysis contributes to the recent move towards 
geographically disaggregated analysis in quantitative studies of political violence by 
investigating these relationships at the city-level. We are utilizing a new dataset on social 
disturbance events for 55 large urban centers in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa for the 1960-2006 
period, and combine these in a time-series analysis with data on the city or urban level as well as 
national-level indicators. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first quantitative analysis of 
political instability and violence looking only at cities, and given the lack of comparable studies, 
the results should be interpreted with some caution. Taken together, the empirical investigation 
concludes that large urban male youth bulges do not seem to generally increase levels of social 
disorder in large cities in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Most importantly, large urban male 
youth bulges do not seem to equate high levels of youth frustration and exclusion. Hence, the 
extent of youth exclusion may not primarily be a product of the relative number of youth in 
cities. However, a relationship that in particular calls for a more detailed analysis, is that when 
we only look at the cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, growth in the youth population aged 15-24 is 
associated with a significantly lower risk of social disturbance, while higher levels of young 
males in the adult male population is associated with more lethal events. This may suggest that 
rural to urban migration of youth is particularly high in periods and places where opportunities 
for urban jobs and education are good, so that urban youth growth rates is really an indicator of 
relatively low youth exclusion.  
  Furthermore, large urban male youth populations do not seem to increase the risk of 
disturbance more even in the context of low secondary education opportunities, or after the 
expansion of tertiary education that could cause a rapid increase in the number of highly 
educated youth with limited employment opportunities. Similarly, also in the context of high 
levels of informal employment, low economic growth, or gender imbalances in the urban youth 
population, large urban male youth bulges appear to be unrelated to social disorder. However, 
while there is no strong statistical relationship between urban youth bulges and social disorder, 
even in the context of unfavorable conditions, several other factors that may greatly affect 
opportunities for youth are significantly contributing to explain where and when social disorder 
events take place. First, semi-democratic regimes experience more social disturbance events, 
presumably due to a lack of institutional arrangements that allow people to voice their grievances 
nonviolently at the same time as such regimes generally lack the capacity to effectively suppress 




contexts at least partly take a generational form, excluding large youth groups from political 
participation. Second, low economic growth is consistently increasing the risk of social 
disturbance. While low economic growth may reduce economic opportunities across broad age 
segments, periods of economic downturn that limit new job creation are likely to affect youth 
more strongly since they have just entered the labor market. Third, low secondary education 
levels among young males aged 20-24 are also strongly associated with higher levels of 
disturbance, whether or not large urban male youth bulges are present. Low education levels may 
signal low government responsiveness to the needs of young people, and low economic 
opportunities in the modern sectors. 
  The current study represents a first correlational, exploratory investigation of patterns of 
urban social disorder, with a particular focus on the significance of age structure and contextual 
factors. The study is severely restricted by the lack of high-reliability city-level indicators of 
youth exclusion. Given the increasing attention paid to issues of urban governance and urban 
youth populations, improved city-level data is crucial in order to be able to monitor urban 
development generally and youth exclusion in particular. The lack of a clear statistical 
association in the current study should not discourage efforts to include youth in development 
strategies. Some of the general relationships uncovered suggest that youth exclusion may be a 
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APPENDIX A: CITIES COVERED, EVENT COUNT 
 
 
City  Country  No. events  No. fatal  % fatal 
Abidjan Ivory  Coast  47  19  40 
Accra Ghana  30  9  30 
Addis Ababa  Ethiopia  71  42  59 
Almaty Kazakhstan  8  3  38 
Antananarivo Malagsy  Republic  27  12  44 
Ashgabad Turkmenistan  2  1  50 
Astana Kazakhstan  0  0  - 
Bamako Mali  15  5  33 
Bangkok Thailand  61  15  25 
Bejing China  105  10  10 
Bishkek Kyrgyz  Republic  17  4  24 
Brazzaville Congo  38  27  71 
Calcutta India  72  35  49 
Colombo Sri  Lanka  93  63  68 
Conakry Guinea  22  9  41 
Dakar Senegal  18  7  39 
Dar es Salaam  Tanzania  9  4  44 
Dhaka Bangladesh  130  43  33 
Dushanbe Tajikistan  26  14  54 
Hanoi  Dem. Rep. of Vietnam   29  22  76 
Harare Zimbabwe  89  29  33 
Islamabad Pakistan  47  16  34 
Jakarta Indonesia  120  30  25 
Johannesburg South  Africa  124  47  38 
Kabul Afghanistan  202  132  65 
Kampala Uganda  53  34  64 
Karachi Pakistan  194  121  62 
Kathmandu Nepal  66  23  35 
Khartoum Sudan  58  19  33 
Kinshasa Zaire  78  27  35 
Kuala Lumpur  Malaysia  28  8  29 
Lagos Nigeria  66  32  48 
Lhasa China  15  4  27 
Lomé Togo  39  18  46 
Luanda Angola  37  18  49 
Lusaka   Zambia  36  16  44 
Manila Philippines  142  52  37 
Maputo Mozambique  29  14  48 
Mogadishu Somalia  95  61  64 




Nairobi Kenya  56  16  29 
New Delhi  India  152  45  30 
Niamey Niger  23  7  30 
Phnom Penh  Cambodia  69  33  48 
Rangoon Burma  45  15  33 
Saigon/Ho Chi Minh C  Dem. Rep. of Vietnam   149  62  42 
Seoul  South Korea   129  18  14 
Singapore Singapore  0  0  - 
Taipei  Republic of China  28  1  4 
Tashkent Uzbekistan  14  5  36 
Teheran   Iran  219  93  42 
Tokyo Japan  51  7  14 
Ulan Bator  Mongolia  14  0  0 
Vientiane Laos  30  11  37 
Yaoundé Cameroun  9  4  44 




Appendix B Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable         Obs          Mean       Std. Dev.         Min          Max 
All events        2575        1.31068      2.627883            0             38 
Lethal events        2575        0.5351456      1.359671            0             15 
Non-lethal ev.  2575        0.775534      1.734097            0             25 
Urban youth b.  2512        34.84697       5.33239     13.89807     51.30927 
Gender bias  2512        1.074789      0.1322951     0.7107648     1.924871 
Population  2575        22.05392      29.58622        .3003       163.6808 
Real gdp pc  2525        3.136006      4.016039       .33209      29.43377 
Real gdp pc gr.    2438        1.939579      6.718567    -53.11781     107.5341 
Regime type   2521       -2.212217      6.232832          -10             10 
Regime squared  2521        43.7267      27.00837            0            100 
Missing regime   2521        0.0154701      0.1234373           0              1 
Ongoing conflict  2521        0.2788576      0.4485263           0              1 
Informal empl.  378        0.4203246      0.2233196           0             0.8 
Secondary ed   1386        0.519446      0.2805326     0.0224091     0.9959601 







Appendix C: Coding of city population 
 
For each city year from 1960 to 2006, United Nations Demographic Yearbooks were consulted. 
These sources provide population information for capital cities and those over with over 100,000 
residents, and are drawn primarily from national census data, but also include estimates and 
measurements from sub-national bodies. As with all disaggregated measurements, there are 
issues measuring between cities using different methodologies to determine city size and what 
constitutes a city’s geographic bounds. The UN Demographic Yearbooks (UNDYB) where 
possible provide measures of both City Proper (i.e. the Metropolitan Area) and the Urban 
Agglomeration. Here these are defined as: 
 
City proper is a large locality with legally fixed boundaries and an administratively recognized 
urban status which is usually characterized by some form of local government. 
 
Urban agglomeration has been defined as comprising the city proper and also the suburban 
fringe or thickly settled territory living outside of, but adjacent to, the city boundaries. 
 
The UNDYB data has been supplemented by two online sources of urban population 
measurement: The World Gazzetteer (WG) (www.world-gazetteer.com) and City Population 
(CP) (www.citypopulation.de). These sites provide census and estimate data as well as that 
provided by other less verifiable sources. Each data point has been coded according to which 
source it was derived from, namely: 
 
1.  UNDYB, relevant year (1960-2006), City Proper 
2.  UNDYB, relevant year (1960-2006), Urban Agglomeration 
3.  World Gazzetteer, relevant year (1960-2006), City Proper 
4.  World Gazzetteer, relevant year (1960-2006),  Urban Agglomeration 
5.  City Population, relevant year (1960-2006), City Proper 
6.  City Population, relevant year (1960-2006), Urban Agglomeration 
 
Variable Construction:  
Due to the greater scope, and likely reliability of UN data over other online population sources, 
priority was given to UNDYB census data. Where these values were missing, WG and CP sites 
were consulted. Encouragingly, the data provided by these two sites very often conferred with 
values for UNDYB data, indicating they are drawn from similar data sources and may at least 
provide some similar level of valid measurement of urban population. When constructing the 
dataset, we gathered data on city size which would reflect the area which incidents of urban 
violence/protest would be recorded, and which best reflect the size and scale of the city. In many 
cases, the metropolitan area would certainly underestimate the size of the area and population 
which would be reported for. A good example of this is Manila. In many cases also, estimates for 
urban agglomeration would overreport the area and population, such as in Tokyo, whose 
agglomeration with Yokohama stands at around 37 million, considerably larger than the 12 
million in the Tokyo agglomeration. For some cities measures of the metropolitan area and urban 




observations but only when there was a high degree of consistency regarding population size and 
growth rate.  
 
Coding of city population size was done based on the year the observation was reported for. 
Missing values were replaced by the nearest previously available observation. For example, if no 
data was available between 1975 and 1978, the 1974 (last available) figure would be used for 
1975 through 1977, with the next available figure (1978) then used. If no data was available for 
the base year 1960, then the closest year prior or following 1960 was used. For example, if a data 
point was available for 1959 and 1965, the 1959 value was used from 1960 and onwards to the 
next data point, here 1965. If the data points were 1955 and 1961, the 1961 value was used from 
1960, 1961 and on to the next available data point. This method of coding means no population 
figures calculated from growth rates between available values were inserted. This means 
population size figures will shift in years with reported observations only. Hence, we avoid 
making potentially flawed assumptions about rates of growth in urban areas.  
 
 
 